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Parallel supercomputer-based Monte Carlo applications depend on pseudorandom number gener-
ators that produce independent pseudorandom streams across many separate processes. We propose
a new scalable class of parallel pseudorandom number generators based on Pohlig–Hellman exponen-
tiation ciphers. The method generates uniformly distributed floating point pseudorandom streams
by encrypting simple sequences of integer messages into ciphertexts by exponentiation modulo prime
numbers. The advantages of the method are: the method is trivially parallelizable by parameter-
ization with each pseudorandom number generator derived from an independent prime modulus,
the method is fully scalable on massively parallel computing clusters due to the large number of
primes available for each implementation, the seeding and initialization of the independent streams
is simple, the method requires only a few integer multiply–mod operations per pseudorandom num-
ber, the state of each instance is defined by only a few integer values, the period of each instance
is different, and the method passes a battery of intrastream and interstream correlation tests using
up to 1013 pseudorandom numbers per test. The 32-bit implementation we propose has millions of
possible instances, all with periods greater than 1018. A 64-bit implementation depends on 128-bit
arithmetic, but would have more than 1015 possible instances and periods greater than 1037.
PACS numbers: 02.70.-c, 05.10.-a, 05.10.Gg, 05.10.Ln, 05.40.-a, 07.05.Tp, 95.75.Wx
I. INTRODUCTION
We propose a new class of scalable parallel pseudorandom number generators for use in large-scale Monte Carlo
and other computer applications that require large numbers of independent streams of pseudorandom numbers. The
method we propose is based on Pohlig–Hellman exponentiation ciphers.1,2 The method creates a pseudorandom stream
by encrypting a simple sequence of short integer plaintext messages mk into ciphertexts ck using the transformation
ck = m
e
k modn, (1)
where each generator instance is based on an independent prime modulus n, and an exponent e that is co-prime to
n − 1. Here and throughout, x = ymod z means x is the remainder of y upon division by z, with 0 ≤ x < z. The
method is based upon elementary number theory.3–5 For every prime number n, the set of integers Z/nZ = [0 . . n−1]
forms a finite field that is closed under addition and multiplication modulo n. Also, the set of nonzero elements
(Z/nZ)∗ = [1 . . n − 1] forms a group that is closed under multiplication, and for every element a in (Z/nZ)∗ there
exists a unique inverse a−1 such that aa−1 modn = 1 . The pseudorandom number generator algorithm described
here cycles through a sequence of messages mk with k = 0, 1, 2, . . . selected from Z/nZ using some simple pattern
that uniformly samples the set. The exponentiation step equation (1) then gives a sequence of ciphertexts ck that
is uniformly distributed on Z/nZ. Uniformly distributed double precision floating point values Rk on the open real
interval (0 . . 1) are formed with a floating point division: Rk = (ck + 1)/(n+ 1).
Most pseudorandom number generators generate the next pseudorandom integer from either the previous pseudo-
random integer in the sequence, or by using two or more pseudorandom integers from earlier in the sequence. This
method is different in that the pseudorandom sequence arises from the encryption of a sequence of integer messages.
In this way, it is similar to cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators2,6 and floating point pseudo-
random number generators7 based on block ciphers. The quality of the pseudorandom sequence from our method is
based on modular exponentiation being a good one-way cryptographic function, meaning that it is computationally
difficult to ascertain the message from the ciphertext without knowing both the modulus and exponent.2,5,6,8,9 The
algorithm we propose here produces excellent, long-period pseudorandom sequences even for 32-bit prime moduli. The
period of the 32-bit implementation we propose is greater than 1018, and has millions of possible instances. Sixty-four
bit implementations have periods in excess of 1037, with more than 1015 possible instances.
Two qualitatively different schemes have been used to create scalable systems of pseudorandom number generators
for use on massively parallel supercomputers: stream splitting and parameter splitting.10 Stream splitting is based
on a single pseudorandom number generator with an extremely long period, with parallelization accomplished by
subdividing the full period into independent non-overlapping subsequences. This method requires careful seeding
to ensure that no two subsequences will overlap for any feasible set of processes. Parameter splitting uses a single
algorithm, but produces independent pseudorandom sequences by assigning different parameters to each process.
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2The SPRNG web site11,12 gives examples of parallel generators of both classes. For example, linear congruential
generators of the form sk = (ask−1 + b) mod p, with p a power of two, can be parallelized by parameter splitting.11–14
The parameters are a, a well-tested multiplier that ensures a maximal period and b, an odd number less than p. Each
process uses the same values of p and a, but the value of b is chosen to be different for each process.15 Another widely
used class of parallel generators are based on the lagged Fibonacci method.11,12,16–18 They are usually of the form
sk = (sk−q ⊗ sk−r) mod p, where p is a power of two, ⊗ is one of the operations addition, exclusive or, subtraction,
or multiplication, and q < r are integer parameters chosen based on primitive polynomials modulo 2.2,5,19 Lagged
Fibonacci generators have periods of the order of 2r, with r typically of the order of several hundred to several
thousand. The state of the generator is defined by a table of r integers or r bits, which represent the most recent
pseudorandom values in the sequence. Parallel implementation of these algorithms can be accomplished by either
stream splitting or parameter splitting.11,12
The parallel pseudorandom number generator class we propose here is based on parameter splitting. In our algo-
rithm, every independent process is assigned a different prime modulus n, which produces an independent pseudo-
random sequence. The sequence of pseudorandom numbers produced using equation (1) are effectively uncorrelated
within a single stream and between streams, and the period of every stream is different. The number of independent
streams is limited only by the number of prime numbers in the range defined by the implementation. For example, in
a 32-bit implementation the prime moduli can be chosen from the set of 98,182,656 primes in the range [231. . 232].20
To demonstrate the relation to encryption and explain some of the useful properties of the method, the message m
can be decrypted from the ciphertext c using the decryption exponent d = e−1 mod (n− 1), i.e. de = 1 + q(n− 1) for
some q.1–5 The decryption exponent d exists and is unique if e and n − 1 are co-prime, i.e if gcd(e, n − 1) = 1. The
decryption exponent can be determined quickly using the extended Euclidean algorithm.2–5 The decryption is based
on Fermat’s little theorem:3–5 for any prime n and for all m in (Z/nZ)∗, mn−1 modn = 1. Therefore
cd modn = mde modn = m1+q(n−1) modn = (m(mn−1)q) modn = mmodn = m. (2)
For any allowed exponent e, equation (1) maps Z/nZ onto a permutation of the same set. Therefore, any message
sequence that uniformly samples Z/nZ will produce ciphertexts that uniformly sample Z/nZ. The Pohlig–Hellman
algorithm is closely related to the more widely used RSA public key encryption method2–6,21 which uses moduli that
are products of two large primes. Using a composite modulus n = pq creates a serous weakness for this application
since every message m that is a multiple of p or q gives a ciphertext c that is also a multiple of p or q, respectively.
In the Pohlig–Hellman cryptographic scheme, the key consisting of the prime n and exponent e must be known only
to the sender and receiver. Otherwise, an eavesdropper can easily determine the decryption exponent. Cryptography
theory suggests using safe primes for the moduli, i.e. primes n for which (n − 1)/2 is also prime.1,2,9,22 This helps
ensure eavesdroppers will find it computationally difficult to take the discrete logarithm to recover the message from
the ciphertext.1,3–5 While our empirical tests do not give noticeably better statistics for safe primes than for primes
in general, the number of safe primes does not seriously limit the scaling with 32-bit moduli since there are 3,060,794
safe primes in the range [231. . 232].23
The algorithm presented here is similar to a block cipher operating in the counter mode which outputs a sequence
of pseudorandom numbers that are ciphertexts resulting from a simple sequence of plaintexts.2,6 The Pohlig–Hellman
method can be used to generate cryptographically secure pseudorandom sequences, but cryptographic applications
require primes with hundreds of digits.1–6,8,9 Our application, instead, uses Pohlig–Hellman encryption of 32-bit
messages to produce pseudorandom sequences suitable for use in Monte Carlo simulations and other applications.
The exponentiations can be accomplished using the method of repeated squaring,2–5 so the number of multiply–mod
operations needed to calculate me modn is less than 2 log2 e. As we will show below, the algorithm can be implemented
using small exponents that require very few multiply–mod operations per pseudorandom number.24 If the modulus
n is chosen to be a prime number less than 232, each multiply–mod operation can be performed in hardware on a
64-bit processor with one 64-bit multiply, and one 64-bit mod. Our algorithm leads to a new scalable class of fast and
effective pseudorandom generators based on parameter splitting. There are several advantages to this pseudorandom
number generation method.
• The algorithm is based on elementary number theory and cryptography.
• The method is trivially parallelizable by parameterization, with each instance derived from an independent
prime modulus.
• Pseudorandom sequences that result from different prime moduli are independent, and have different periods.
• The method is fast since it requires only a few integer multiply–mod operations per pseudorandom number.
• The method is fully scalable on massively parallel computing clusters due to the millions of available 32-bit
primes.
3• As we will show below, the period of the generator can be greatly extended by using message skips derived from
a prime number linear congruential pseudorandom number generator.
• The seeding and initialization of the independent streams is simple, and it is possible to initialize each process
without needing information about the states of any of the other processes. The state of each generator is
defined by only seven integers: m, e, n, and c, and integer pseudorandom skip parameters s, p and a defined
below. All of these values can be stored in local memory, and require no global storage. The values n, e, p and
a are fixed in each instance. Only the three values m, s, and c change during calls to the generator.
• The algorithm allows one to quickly jump far forward or backward in the pseudorandom sequence.
• The method does not require combining generators25 or shuffling26 to remove correlations.
• The algorithm is simple enough to allow the generator to be implemented as an in-line function for efficiency.
• The algorithm can be implemented in parallel on vector computers and GPUs.
• The method passes a battery of intrastream and interstream correlation tests using up to 1013 pseudorandom
numbers per test.
II. MESSAGE SKIPPING ALGORITHMS
The selection of messages to be encrypted for a given modulus n can be accomplished in many different ways, but
they can all be expressed in terms of an integer skip sequence with the skips sk chosen from Z/nZ:
mk = (mk−1 + sk) modn, (3a)
ck = m
e
k modn. (3b)
Note that if the skip values sk are chosen uniformly and randomly (not pseudorandomly) from Z/nZ, then the
sequence of messages mk forms a uniform random sequence on the same set. Message mk is, in effect, a one-time
pad encryption of message mk−1.2 Since the set of ciphertexts is one-to-one with the set of messages, the sequence of
ciphertexts ck also forms a uniformly distributed random sequence.
In encryption, it is essential to avoid cribs, i.e. messages that result in easily decoded ciphertexts. For example, the
messages m = 0, 1, n − 1 are cribs for all allowed exponents e since me modn = 0, 1, n − 1, respectively. Calculation
efficiency makes it desirable to use small exponents to reduce the number of multiply–mod operations needed to
generate each pseudorandom number. RSA-based cryptographic applications often use small exponents such as
e = 3, 5, 17.6 Messages with me < n and (n − m)e < n result in trivially decodable ciphertexts, so exponents
e < log2 n result in additional cribs. Cribs can be avoided by padding messages to ensure no messages are close
to 0 or n. For cryptographic applications, the padding needs to have a random component.2,6 For our application,
eliminating cribs from the message stream biases the ciphertext distribution due to the elimination of ciphertexts
formed from messages with me < n and (n −m)e < n, resulting in a slight but systematic under-sampling of small
and large values of c. Even though the effect of this is small, we choose not to implement an algorithm that does not
give a uniform distribution of ciphertexts over the full period. For our purpose, it is not necessary to eliminate cribs,
since they would appear in a random message sequence, but rather to prevent correlated sequences of cribs. Our goal
is to select a simple skip pattern that ensures a uniform sampling of the set of all messages, is computationally fast,
has a long period, allows the use of small encryption exponents, and avoids correlated cribs. We will accomplish this
by using a pseudorandom skip sequence that, over the full period of the generator, uniformly samples the messages
in Z/nZ, but we will first examine the properties of pseudorandom ciphertext sequences derived from simpler skip
patterns.
• The simplest skip sequence that uniformly samples Z/nZ is the unit skip, i.e. sk = 1 for all k. Pohlig–Hellman
encryption of this sequence is, in effect, a block cipher operating in counter mode.2,6 The message sequence is
mk = (m0 + k) modn, with the period P of the generator being P = n. For 32-bit moduli, one can easily test
the full period of the generator. In spite of the cribs near m = 0 and m = n − 1, the sequence ck = ke modn
with 0 6 k < n passes most statistical tests for randomness even for small exponents. Naturally, the full-period
sequence produces a perfectly uniform one-dimensional histogram since after n steps every value c will appear
once, and only once, in the sequence. Except for the one-dimensional frequency test, and other tests that are
affected by the uniformity of the sampling of numbers in the range Z/nZ, and in spite of the symmetry noted
below, the exponentiation cipher with unit skips passes all of our other statistical correlations tests for exponents
4e = 9 and e = 17. By comparison, all linear congruential generators fail all D-dimensional correlations tests
once a substantial fraction of the period has been exhausted, since all D-dimensional histograms become uniform
as the period of the generator is approached.19 The exponentiation cipher does not suffer from this; see figures 1
and 2 which display the two-dimensional correlation patterns for a prime number linear congruential generator,
and a unit-skip Pohlig–Hellman generator using the same prime modulus. As with most pseudorandom number
generators, there is a symmetry in the pseudorandom sequence. The Pohlig–Hellman cipher has the symmetry
(n−m)e modn = n−me modn,
i.e. the ciphertexts derived from messages in [1 . . (n − 1)/2] are strongly correlated with the messages in
[(n+ 1)/2 . . (n− 1)], but in reverse order.
• The next simplest skip algorithm is the constant skip: sk = b with 1 < b < n − 1, so mk = (m0 + kb) modn.
This message pattern is especially important for understanding the quality of our proposed pseudorandom skip
algorithm discussed next. For most values of b, the constant skip removes sequential and closely spaced cribs.
However, other than breaking up closely spaced cribs, the pattern produced by constant skips is not substantially
better than the unit skip pattern since
(kb)e modn = ((be modn)(ke modn)) modn, (4)
i.e. this is the same as the unit-skip sequence except for a single constant factor be modn. Like the unit skip
case, there is a symmetry in the pseudorandom sequence since ((n − k)b)e modn = n − (kb)e modn. As with
the unit skip, the constant skip passes a battery of full-period statistical tests for e = 9 and e = 17, except ones
affected by the uniformity of the one-dimensional distribution.
• Our recommended skip pattern is a pseudorandom skip produced by a prime number linear congruential pseu-
dorandom number generator:13,19,25
sk = ask−1 mod p = s0ak mod p, (5)
with prime modulus p < n. The multiplier a is chosen to be a primitive root3–5 mod p that delivers a full period,
well-tested pseudorandom sequence.13,19,25 This gives pseudorandom skips sk in the range (Z/pZ)∗, with the
period of the skip sequence being p− 1. This results in the following pseudorandom ciphertext sequence:
sk = s0a
k mod p, (6a)
mk =
m0 + k∑
j=1
s0a
j mod p
 modn, (6b)
ck = m
e
k modn. (6c)
Using a pseudorandom skip sequence serves several important purposes:
– A pseudorandom skip effectively eliminates the problem of correlated cribs, allowing the use of small
exponents.
– Using a pseudorandom skip extends the period of the generator to P = n(p− 1).
– The method provides a uniform sampling of ciphertexts over the full period of the generator. Each message
m in Z/nZ, and hence each ciphertext c in Z/nZ, will appear exactly p− 1 times in the sequence.
– The state of each generator is defined by only seven integers: {m, s, c, n, e, p, a}.
– Implementations using 32-bit primes are fast. With small exponents, each pseudorandom number requires
only a few 64-bit multiply–mod operations that can be implemented in hardware on 64-bit processors.
– The implementations suggested below pass a battery of statistical tests with up to 1013 pseudorandom
numbers per test.
First, let’s prove that the period of the generator is P = n(p − 1). Since a is a primitive root mod p, after
p − 1 pseudorandom skips sk will have cycled through every value in (Z/pZ)∗, so sk+p−1 = sk and mk+p−1 =(
mk +
∑p−1
s=1 s
)
modn = (mk+p(p−1)/2) modn. This means the sequence of messages separated by multiples
of p− 1 steps in the sequence are derived from a constant skip b = p(p− 1)/2 modn. Since p and (p− 1)/2 are
5coprime to n, the constant skip b is also co-prime to n. Therefore, the state of the generator after k = q(p−1)+r
steps, with q = bk/(p− 1)c and r = kmod (p− 1), is given by
sk = s0a
r mod p, (7a)
mk =
m0 + qp(p− 1)/2 + r∑
j=1
(
s0a
j mod p
) modn, (7b)
ck = m
e
k modn. (7c)
This demonstrates the mathematical form of the pseudorandom sequence across the full period of the generator.
Since sk+n(p−1) = sk and mk+n(p−1) = mk, and each subsequence of messages of length p − 1 is different from
every other subsequence, the period the generator is P = n(p − 1). Over the full period, every ciphertext in
Z/nZ will appear exactly p − 1 times. One can use equation (7) to skip k steps forward directly to any point
in the pseudorandom sequence, with skips being fast if k is close to a multiple of p− 1. Backward skips of are
accomplished by replacing a with a−1 mod p, subtracting rather than adding in equation (7b), and reordering
equations (7a) and (7b).27
The simple form of the ciphertext sequence allows one to determine the full-period D-dimensional correlations
pattern for rectangular regions with volume L0L
D−1
1 in O(pL0) steps, i.e. without needing to exhaust the
generator. The D-dimensional density of points (ck, ck+1, . . . , ck+D−1) over the full period is ρD = (p−1)/nD−1
so the average number of points in the volume above is (p − 1)L0(L1/n)D−1. One can select L0 points ck,
with the succeeding points given by ck+1 = (c
d
k modn + s)
e modn, ck+2 = (c
d
k modn + s + (as) mod p)
e modn,
etc. where the skips s take on all values in (Z/pZ)∗. A magnified region near the origin of the full-period
two-dimensional pattern for safe prime n = 4294967087, p = 2147483647, a = 784588716,13 and e = 9 is shown
in figure 3, with the full-period three-dimensional pattern shown in figure 4.
We tested the quality of 32-bit pseudorandom sequences based on pseudorandom skip sequences using a battery
of independent statistical tests. We first tested uniform double precision floating point pseudorandom sequences
Rk over the period of the skip generator for more than ten-thousand different safe primes between 2
31 and
232, and used a single prime number linear congruential pseudorandom number generator recommended by
L’Ecuyer:13 p = 231 − 1 = 2147483647 and a = 784588716. Even using exponents as small as e = 3, the
intrastream pseudorandom sequences pass all of our statistical tests across the period of the skip generator.
We then used equation (7) to test for intrastream correlations among ciphertexts separated by p − 1 steps in
the sequence across the constant skip period P = n using thousands of safe primes between 231 and 232. This
pseudorandom sequence is given by cq(p−1) = (m0 + qb)e modn, with b = p(p− 1)/2 modn and q = 0, 1, . .n− 1.
These constant skip sequences pass all of our the statistical tests for exponents as small as e = 7 for up to 225
pseudorandom numbers, and all but the one-dimensional tests across the period P = n. (As noted earlier, the
one-dimensional constant skip distribution becomes uniform over the period. These are the only tests that the
constant skip sequences appear to fail.) Based on this, we recommend using exponents e = 9 or e = 17, which
require only four or five multiply–mod operations per exponentiation, respectively.
Since ciphertexts separated by k < p− 1 steps demonstrate good intrastream statistics because of the pseudo-
random skip, and ciphertexts separated by multiples of p − 1 steps demonstrate good statistics with constant
skips b = p(p− 1)/2 modn, one has good reason to believe that the entire pseudorandom sequence should pass
a battery of statistical tests until the length of the pseudorandom sequence approaches the full period. To
test this, we performed intrastream statistical tests of the pseudorandom 32-bit skip algorithm over as large a
fraction of the period and for as many different moduli as possible. We tested sequences of 1011 pseudorandom
numbers using hundreds of different primes, sequences of 1012 pseudorandom numbers using dozens of different
primes, and sequences of 1013 pseudorandom numbers using a few different primes. This latter test corresponds
to several thousand periods of the skip sequence. The method passed every test we applied.
We also tested to ensure that the algorithm displayed lack of correlation between streams. Suppose one has
Np processes each with a different prime modulus n
(α) with α = 0, 1, . . . , Np − 1, and pseudorandom sequences
R
(α)
0 , R
(α)
1 , . . .. Our interstream correlations tests draw the pseudorandom numbers from the Np streams in the
order R
(0)
1 , R
(1)
1 , R
(2)
1 , . . . , R
(Np−1)
1 , R
(0)
2 , R
(1)
2 , . . .. We tested groupings of Np = 2, 32, 1024, 32768 and 1048576
different streams, using exponents e = 5, 9, and 17. We also included tests using Np = 3, 060, 794 safe primes,
i.e. all of the safe primes in [231 . . 232]. To test that seeding coincidences do not create spurious correlations, we
performed many of the interstream tests by starting every sequence with exactly the same initial values m0 and
s0, but avoiding cases in which one of the early messages in the sequence is a crib. The interstream correlations
passed every test for up to 1013 pseudorandom numbers per test.
6III. TESTS
We first applied well-established pseudorandom number test suites DIEHARD,28 NIST29, and TestU01,30 to ensure
the generator passes a wide variety of tests. We then applied the following ten additional tests that produce histograms
to which one can apply a chi-square test.19 For each test, we calculated χ2 and the associated P-value, i.e. the one-
sided probability of χ2 having that value above or below the median. We applied these additional tests to sequences
of up to 1013 pseudorandom numbers per test.
• One-dimensional frequency test:19 We distributed the sequence of pseudorandom numbers into a one-dimensional
histogram with 220 bins, and compared the histogram to a uniform Poisson distribution.
• Two-dimensional serial test:19 We distributed pairs of pseudorandom numbers into a two-dimensional histogram
with 220 bins, and compared the histogram to a uniform Poisson distribution. This tests for sequential pair
correlations in the sequence.
• Three-dimensional serial test:19 We distributed triplets of pseudorandom numbers into a three-dimensional
histogram with 106 bins, and compared the histogram to a uniform Poisson distribution. This tests for sequential
triplet correlations in the sequence.
• Four-dimensional serial test:19 We distributed groups of four pseudorandom numbers into a four-dimensional
histogram with 220 bins, and compared the histogram to a uniform Poisson distribution. This tests for sequential
four-point correlations in the sequence.
• Five dimensional serial test:19 We distributed groups of five pseudorandom numbers into a five-dimensional
histogram with 220 bins, and compared the histogram to a uniform Poisson distribution. This tests for sequential
five-point correlations in the sequence.
• Poker test:19 We used groups of five pseudorandom numbers and counted the number of pairs, three-of-a-
kind etc. formed from five cards and ten denominations, and compared the resulting histogram to a Poisson
distribution derived from the exact probabilities. This tests for a variety of five-point correlations in the sequence.
• Collision test:19 We distributed 214 pseudorandom numbers into 220 bins and compared the histogram of the
number of collisions against a Poisson distribution derived from the exact probabilities. This tests for long-range
correlations in the sequence.
• Runs test:19 We compared the histogram of the length of runs of 0’s (R ≤ 0.5) and 1’s (R > 0.5) to the Poisson
distribution derived from the exact probabilities. This tests for short-range correlations of the leading bits.
• Fourier test:11 We used a fast Fourier transform31 to calculate the Fourier coefficients of sequences of M = 220
double precision floating point pseudorandom numbers,
xˆk =
1√
M
M−1∑
j=0
xje
2piijk/M , (8)
where xj = Rj−0.5. The real and imaginary parts of the Fourier coefficients xˆk with k = 0, . . . ,M/2−1 should
each be gaussian distributed about zero with variance 1/24. We distributed the real and imaginary parts of the
Fourier coefficients into a histogram, and compared the result to a Poisson distribution derived from the exact
gaussian distribution. This tests for long-range pair correlations in the sequence.
• Two-dimensional Ising model energy distribution test:32,33 We performed a Wolff algorithm34 Monte Carlo
simulation at the critical point of the two-dimensional Ising model on a 128× 128 square lattice, and compared
the energy histogram to a Poisson distribution derived from the exact probabilities32,33 Since the Wolff algorithm
is based on stochastically growing fractal critical clusters that can span the system, this tests for long-range
correlations in the pseudorandom sequence, and has proven to be effective at identifying weak generators.32,35
Assigning an independent generator to each of the 32768 bonds in the lattice tests provides an additional test
for exposing interstream correlations.
For several of these tests, we sampled the low-order bits to confirm they do not harbor any hidden correlations. We
define passing our tests by there being no P < 10−8 events among the tests. Since there were tens of thousands of
independent tests, we also counted the number of P < 10−4 events in our samples to confirm that the number was
consistent with the expected number. Finally, we applied chi-square tests to histograms of the full-period distribution
of (ck, ck+1, .., ck+D−1) sequences in 224 D-dimensional rectangular volumes of size L0LD−11 with L0 = 2
7 and L1 ≈
n/224/(D−1), for D = 3, 4, 5. The generator passed every test.
7IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The algorithm for generating uniformly distributed double precision floating point pseudorandom numbers R on
the open interval (0 . . 1) is:
s := (as) mod p (9a)
m := (m+ s) modn (9b)
c := me modn (9c)
R := (c+ 1)/(n+ 1) (9d)
RETURNR (9e)
In a 32-bit implementation, operations (9a)-(9c) of the the algorithm can be implemented using 64-bit unsigned
integer arithmetic, which can be executed in hardware on 64-bit processors. This algorithm generates the sequence
given by equations (7). For efficiency, one can precalculate the double precision floating point value 1.0/(n+ 1) and
perform a floating point multiplication instead of a floating point divide in step (9d).
For a multiprocessor environment, each of the Np processes can be assigned an independent prime modulus n
(α)
using well-established primality tests. The Rabin-Miller test,5,36,37 which is the same as Algorithm P in Knuth,19
provides a simple probabilistic test for primality. Every odd prime n = 1+2rt with t odd satisfies one of the following
conditions for every base g in (Z/nZ)∗: either gt modn = 1, or g2jt modn = n − 1 for some some j in the range
0 ≤ j < r. A composite number n satisfying these criteria is called a strong pseudoprime to base g. For any odd
composite, the number of bases g for which n is a strong pseudoprime to the base g is less than n/4, so if the test is
applied repeatedly with M randomly chosen bases in (Z/nZ)∗, the probability that a composite will pass every test
is less than 4−M .5,19,36,37 Better yet, the Rabin-Miller test can quickly and deterministically identify all primes below
264. There are no composite numbers below 264 that are strong pseudoprimes to all of the twelve smallest prime bases
(g = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37).38–42 Therefore, any number less than 264 that passes the Rabin-Miller test
for all twelve of these bases is prime. Likewise, any number less than 232 that passes the Rabin-Miller test for all
of the five smallest prime bases (g = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11) is prime. For efficiency, one first checks to see if any small primes
divide n before applying the Rabin-Miller test.
One can initialize the generators using the system time variable and the process identifier α to construct unique
values of n(α), and different starting values s
(α)
0 and m
(α)
0 for each of the Np processes. One might use equation (7)
to skip each generator forward relative to some base state such as m0 = 0 and s0 = 1 to ensure the initial skips and
messages are all unsynchronized. Even if two generators later become synchronized with the same values of m and
s, the values for the ciphertexts for different moduli will be different due to the encryption step, and the message
synchrony is removed after a few skips, even if the skips were to remain synchronized.
The implementation for 32-bit moduli is simple and fast since the multiply–mod operations can be executed in
hardware using standard 64-bit unsigned arithmetic on 64-bit processors. The quality of the pseudorandom sequences
does not appear to be dependent on the values of the prime moduli, but we recommend using safe primes selected
from [231 . . 232] unless the number of processes exceeds 3,060,794, the number of safe primes in that range. If the
implementation requires more than 3,060,794 instances, there are 49,091,941 primes n in [231 . . 232] with e = 9 coprime
to n− 1, and 92,045,560 primes in that range with e = 17 coprime to n− 1. The number of well-tested 31-bit prime
number pseudorandom skip generators is not scalable, but one can use the ones available in the literature13,25 to
substantially extend the number of possible instances.43
The full period of each generator is P = n(p− 1) > 262 ' 4.6× 1018. This 32-bit implementation passes all of our
intrastream and interstream correlations tests for e = 9 and e = 17, for up to 1013 pseudorandom numbers per prime
modulus. The exponent e = 9 requires only five multiply–mod operations per pseudorandom number, one for the skip
and four for the exponentiation, and the exponent e = 17 requires only six. Consequently, the code is compact and
simple enough to be implemented as an in-line function.
If far longer periods or far more instances are needed, one can implement the algorithm using 64-bit primes. There
are approximately 3 × 1015 safe primes in [263 . . 264]. L’Ecuyer13 provides suitable pseudorandom skip parameters
near 263 so the period of each process is P = n(p − 1) > 2126 ' 8.5 × 1037. Using 64-bit prime moduli results in a
speed penalty with current processors since the multiply–mod operations need to be implemented in using 128-bit
unsigned integers. Since a single process is unlikely to exhaust a 63-bit pseudorandom skip, one might consider using
smaller encryption exponents for efficiency. Preliminary statistical tests indicate the method works well for 64-bit safe
prime moduli even when using e = 3, the smallest allowed exponent.
8V. CONCLUSION
We propose a new class of parallel pseudorandom number generators based on Pohlig–Hellman exponentiation
ciphers. The method creates pseudorandom streams by encrypting simple sequences of integer messages. The method
is fully scalable based on parametrization since each process can be assigned a unique prime modulus. By using
pseudorandom skips among messages, one can use small exponents and the period is greatly extended. For 32-bit
implementations, only a few 64-bit multiply–mod operations are needed per pseudorandom number. There are millions
of possible independent instances, and the period of each instance is is greater than 1018. We have tested thousands of
different pseudorandom streams for intrastream and interstream correlations using up to 1013 pseudorandom numbers
per test, and all pass a battery of statistical tests. A 64-bit implementation would have more than 1015 possible
instances and periods greater than 1037. Sample C++ code for a 32-bit multi-processor MPI implementation of the
Pohlig–Hellman pseudorandom number generator with pseudorandom skip can be found at http://works.bepress.
com/paul_beale/.
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FIG. 1: Magnified region near the origin of the two-dimensional full-period sk+1 vs. sk pattern delivered by a prime number
linear congruential pseudorandom number generator (equation (5)) with p = 232 − 5 = 4294967291 and a = 279470273.13 The
axes cover the range [0 . . 220], i.e. a linear magnification factor of 4096. The 16 subsquares have area ∆x2 = (218)2 each.
As with all linear congruential generators, every D-dimensional full-period pattern forms a perfect lattice,19 so the number of
points in each cell is very close to Ncell = ∆x
2/(p− 1) ' 16 events in this case.
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FIG. 2: Magnified region near the origin of the two-dimensional full-period ck+1 vs. ck pattern for a Pohlig–Hellman exponen-
tiation cipher (equation (3)) using the same prime as in Fig. 1, n = 232 − 5 = 4294967291, exponent e = 9, and unit skip,
i.e. mk = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. The axes cover the range [0 . . 220], i.e. a linear magnification factor of 4096. The 16 subsquares
have area ∆x2 = (218)2 each. Unlike linear congruential generators, the distribution of points in the cells approximate a
Poisson distribution with Ncell ≈ ∆x2/n±
√
∆x2/n ' 16± 4 in this case. The unit-skip correlated cribs (0, 1), (1, 29 = 512),
(512, 39 = 19683), and (19693, 49 = 218 = 262144) appear near the vertical axis in the lower left square.
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FIG. 3: Sequential ciphertext pairs (ck, ck+1) in a magnified two-dimensional square region over the full period of the generator
for a pseudorandom skip with n = 4294967087, p = 2147483647, e = 9 and d = 3817748521. The region shown is a 27 × 27
square closest to the origin, Every prime n–e–p combination gives a different full-period pattern, but the two-dimensional full-
period pattern is independent of the value of primitive root a. The average full-period density of the pairs in two dimensions
is ρ2 = (p − 1)/n ' 0.5. Each integer pair possibility appears either once or not at all. The absence of any points along the
diagonal with ck+1 = ck is because 0 < sk < p for all k. Even though the full period is P = n(p − 1) ' 4.6 × 1018, it is
feasible to determine the local full-period pattern without exhausting the generator since ck+1 = ((c
d
k modn) + sk+1)
e modn.
One selects only ciphertexts ck in the chosen domain while testing all skips sk+1 in (Z/pZ)∗ to see which ones give ck+1’s in
the chosen range. Primes with p ≈ n give patterns that fill in nearly every (ck, ck+1) pair, except those along the diagonal.
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FIG. 4: Sequential ciphertext triplets (ck, ck+1, ck+2) over the full period of the generator in a rectangular three-dimensional
region for a pseudorandom skip with n = 4294967087, p = 2147483647, a = 784588716, e = 9 and d = 3817748521. The
region shown is a L0L
2
1 = 2
9 × 216 × 216 rectangular slab closest to the origin with volume V3 = 241. The short first
dimension is projected onto the front face. Even though the full period is P = n(p − 1) ' 4.6 × 1018, it is feasible to
determine the local full-period pattern without exhausting the generator since ck+1 = ((c
d
k modn) + sk+1)
e modn and ck+2 =
((cdk modn)+sk+1+(ask+1) mod p)
e modn. One selects all ciphertexts ck in [0 . . L0−1] and all skips sk+1 in (Z/pZ)∗ to see which
ones give ck+1 and ck+2 inside the chosen volume. The three-dimensional density of triplets is ρ3 = (p−1)/n2. The result shown
here of the occupancies of the sixteen subslabs is consistent with a Poisson distribution with Ncell ≈ ρ3Vcell±
√
ρ3Vcell ' 16±4.
